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extremely abundant.Of  coursei it should  not astonish 
axiybody  that SRec:lalisls  have  quite  a  number  of  c1E!-
finltions  for~ this phenomenon  - international enter-
prises,  transnationals,  multinationals,  etc .... and 
de~w.ribin9  them  as  geocemt.ric,  ethnocentric,  and  so  on. 
I  am  not  going  to enter  into all  thes·e ·definitions,  I 
just want  to  give  one  rather general  notion  of  what  I 
think  is the best and  broadest definition of  a  multi-
national. It is  a  company  which  controls or manages 
productive  and/or  commercial  activities in several 
countries  - in other words,  a  multinational enterprise 
is one  v1hich  permanently  exercise  economic  activities 
in  diff~rent countries  under  some  form  of  coordination. 
This definition excludes  enterprises of  the  following 
two  cateqories: 
1)  large-scale expott-import  houses 
2)  local enterprises where  only  the  ownership  is foreign. 
Here  you  will  note  that multinationals  thus  defined 
comprise all units  engaged  in international  transfers 
of  one  kind  or another.  A multinational  not  only  moves wheQJ  it acquires subsidiaries, 
or  fnyestrnont;~,  or  repatriates  bem~f:i:ts,  but.  it also 
· moveB  a  nun1ber  of other  goods  somet1.rnes  temporarily, 
somet::inws  permanen t.ly,  such  as  ~\  and  D  and  otll.er  krYovl-
how. 
Fl nally,  the multinationals  hav~~  a  vr=ry  considerable 
part of  world  trade.  It is estimated,  for  example,  that 
in recent years  more  than  a  quarter  of  the  exportatlons 
made  by  the multinational  enterprises  situated  i.n  Great 
Br  i tai11  were  destined· fo:t:"  their  mvn  subsidiaries. 
I  am  now  going  to  look  into  the  importance  of  the mul-
tinationals.  The  development  of  the multinationals  has 
mainly  taken  the  form  of direct investments  abroad  and 
her€~,  E~spec  ia.lly direc  1:  1-\rm.::.r ican  investments all over 
the world.  Later,  I  will  give  you  a  few  f:i.gures  on 
direct investments,  but  for  noVJ  I  will merely  stress 
that  the  importance of  the multinationals  is much  greater 
than  is indicated  by  direct  investment  figures.  These 
statistics only give  bool< -·values  and  we  all  know  what 
th0._y  are worth.  'I'he  statistics are  (:'!Stimated  - since 
they  an::  only listing the directly controlled  invest-
ments  of  the multinationals  - to  show  only  between  25 
to  50%  of  the controlled assets.  For  1969,  for  instance, I 
; 
of direct Americ.:ih: . 
- - - - -
investment:  in  the European  ComrnunJt<y. (the  origl.mil  six· 
· ·  conn tries 'only)  was  ten  bllliof1 dollars,  and  that this 
-in  r~~lity  ~e~iesented  rndustri~l assets of fhci  6rder 
o£  not less than  40  b:LJ.l~ion dollars controllr~d by  U.S . 
. ente:q.n:'lses. · 
It is only  for  u.s.  enterprises  abroad  that  ~  r~lative-
ly  prec~se $tatistic is  computed:  thjs is not  the  case 
for  the  rest of  the .world.  A  1968  estimate of  the  book-
value  of  the holdings of  the multinationals outside 
theiF mother-countries  produced  a  figure  of  a  hundred 
billion dollars.  The  1970  figure  was  a  hundred  and  fifty 
billion dollars;  this corresponds  to  a  turnover  for 
the  same  year of at least  300  billion dollars. 
In comparison,  one  could  mention  that the  1970  value of 
total world  trade,  including  internal  European  Community 
trade,  was  290  billion dollars.  The  same  year,  the  GNP 
of  France,  Italy and  Benelux  was  of  the  same  size  - this 
latter figure is simply  an  illustration,  since  I  know 
that you  cannot  fatrly  compare  tradE.~  turnover  and  GNP 
fiqures. 
In  this respect,  I  would  like  to  add  that the  150  bil-
lion dollars mentioned  for  1970  is  a  very  conservative sine(.(} t  was  only  '!:he  anci ·again 
only  conpei·ned  mul tJna U ona.l s'  holdings  outside  their 
horne  connb~it'lS.  :rr you  multiply  by  3 .or  4,  you  Will 
get  thE!  asEH:ts, -aml  you  \·Jill  inost likely have  to double 
this  figur~ agaLn if you  war~ to  include  the activities 
of  the multinational  1n  fts  horne  country.  This  again 
tallies  '"':i. th the  surn  of  1:-.he  production total of  the 
l~O.largest multional  enterprises whjch  for  1970  was 
of  the  order of  5  to  600  billion dollars. 
As  for direct Amer.ica1.1  investments  abroad,  I  will give 
yOu  a  fev1  figures: 
In  1950,  the  book-value  ·vms  estimated at  11,8  billion 
dollars, 
In  1972,  this figure  was  94  billion dollars. 
Durinq  the  same  P·~rlod,  l1.merican  investment  under~.·1en·t 
a  complete  reorientatio11.  At  the  start,  investments 
went  prj_marily  into  the  supply  of  raw materials  and 
basJc  products  - which  in  fe1ct.  tnPant  that most  of  these 
investments  were  made  in  the  LDCs.  This  changed  in  two 
dJ.rections  during  the  fifties.  l\  larqer proportion of 
investments  went  to  industrialized countries  - specifi-
cally into Western  Europe  - while  the object of  invest-
ffi0nt  changed  from  extraction  to manufacturing. ·- 5 
crbe muropnan  Cbrnmunfty  of  the  then Six  was  t:he  zone':! 
which  attracted mos  1:  of  the  investments;  undeJ:t9k}:r1g s 
in  thf~  Oni ted  Kingdom,  for  instance,  were  relc11ively 
•.... neg leo ted: 
E.c.  (Si.x) 
U.K. 
World 
1950 
637 
847 
11.788 
% 
5,4 
7,2 
100 
1972 
15.745 
9.509 
94.031 
16,8 
lOrl 
100 
For  some  years  we  have  also  had  a  counter-flow  in  the 
form  of direct European  investment  in the  u.s.  From 
a  book-value of  3  billion dollars  in  1950,  it has 
risen to  some  14  billion dollars in 1972. 
In  certain  European  cc~mtries like Belgium  the  importance 
of  mul  i.:.ina tionals is particularly pronounced.  According 
to  a  Belgian National  Bank  study,  the  net  invest.ment  in 
Belgian  industrial enterprises  from  multinationals,  in 
the  period  from  1964  to  1967,  is  estimatE~d at  35%  of  t·.he 
total.  It must  be  added  that  in  the  traditional  sectors 
such  as  textile,  paper  and  leather,  Am(~r:Lcan enterprises 
have  not  shown  any  inteJ~es  t:  in  investment.  On  the  ot.her 
hand,  in  the  chemical  industry,  foreign  firms  in  Belgium 
account  for  45%  of  ~he employment,  72%  of  the  added ..,·  6  .·~ 
- - - _-
the  e}{ports.  In other· EuropE~!'ll1 
the  influence of rntlltfrwtional.s is less,  but enl:lre. 
inc1tfstrtes both  in  the  U  .K •,  Holland, . etc.,  are  under 
foreign  dominance. 
I11  1966,  i·t.  was  estJ.mated  that. the  1\rner.ican  industry 
controlled  the  following  E,g.c,  economic  activities 
(the  Six): 
refineries:  33%  infonna U.on  processing  80% 
- automobile  industry  25% 
chemical  industry  12-% 
- electronics  16% 
The  reasons  for  the  development  of  the  multinationals 
are  of  course multiple.  In  a  number  of cases,  the first 
multinationals developed  before  the  Second  World  War 
to  secure  the  supply of  raw materials.  This  was,  for 
example,  the  case  for  certain oil multinationals  and 
for  companies  like Unilever,  United Fruit,  etc. 
In  the  post war  perJod,  the  orientation  was  different, 
and  l:be  Jnvestments  were  prlmnriJy  cl.i.rcct'~'c]  tovwrd 
already  i nd ustr  ia:u  zeu  con  ntr:i.c~n  or  tho::;;e  on  t.lw  point 
o:f  being  industrialized.  1\s  t.he  multinationals  were 
developed  as  large_manufacturing  companies,  they  of 
course  lect  to  an  enlargement  in world  trade.  In  1953, 
trade  between  industrialized countries  represented  37%  of trad~~.  I'n  1 ~)7 3,  recJp:ioc[ll  tracre  Ge't~1een 
ind  ust1~iril:i. zed nat:l  ons  had  r:tsc~n  to  ~52% of world  !.~rade •. 
At.  f.ho  same  time,  the  phrl:  rerJresenti.nq  trade~  between 
industrlc1ll.zed  and  non·-i.ndustt~Jal:i.zed countries  £~;:11  -,  ---:·  -- _:o:- - - -,-- -
:Ei'p!n20  t6  some  12~  ~- Thls  m~ans, ln  ot::l1e1~  words,  that 
trade  :i.n  InarlUfactured  goods  het\veen  h:i.ghly  develOJ.Jed 
countries developed  much  faster  than  the  trade  in  raw 
materials. 
~his evolution has  been  considerably  stimulated  by 
regional  integration e!forts  such  as the creation,of 
tbe  European  Community  and  the· European  Free 'l'rade 
Area.  The  existence of  the  European  Community  has 
p~ovoked the  biggest  reduction  in tariffs,  not only 
in  intra-European  trade,  but  on  the  world  level. 
This  European  fact  har-o  undoubtedly  cont.ributed  t:o  the 
development  of direct  inVE:'stments  abroad  between  indus-
trialized countries.  It has  contributed  in another 
fashion  t.oo.  Accordin9  to  f1  .. mer ican  studies  into  the 
mot:i va ti.on  of American  investors· abroad  in  the  period 
1960-61,  U.S.  investors  sought  new  and  rapidly  expanding 
marl<et.:f:;,  In the  l!lajor:ity of  the  inchu;trial  Hectors,  more 
than  half of  the  enterprises  were  guided  by  the  expansion 
motive.  'I'his  was  distinctly more  .important  than  the  \<lish 
to  hurdle  the tariff barrier.  This  latter was  only  a Another  element  was· of  coursE•  t:he  factor of  cc.H3t: 
product:Ion costs for  a  rnuohel:- of products  t·1ere  cheaper 
than  in  the ·U.S.  On  the other  hand,  this  factor  vtas 
probe:1hly  outweighed  b~  higher general  costs  such  as 
royalties  a.nd  transportation. 
---00-~-
The  development of  the.multinationals is of  course 
ljnked  to concentrati6n where  the  advantages  are: 
1)  the  possibility of  securing  cheaper  and  better 
supplies of raw materials; 
2)  the  max:iJrmm· utili  za  t:i.on  of  conunercial  ne t.work s; 
3)  the  possibility of procuring capital  v~1ere it is 
available at the  cheap(::!St  rate,  and  using it where 
it gives  the  best yield. 
Beside  these advantages,  which  are  purely  the  advantages 
of  concentration,  some  specific  colltmercial  factors 
advantRgeous  to multinationals  should  be  mentioned: 
A  muJ.tinational  pennits  the  rapJd  distribution of  the 
technology,  inven I::Jons  and  Y.nmJ·-hm·;  - .it is undoubtedly 
i.n  Ud.s  field  that  Amer:i.can  enterprtses  have  played  the 
largest part in  the  modernization  of  European  industry. 
vH thou t  U.s.  know·-hovr  and  technlgue,  I  do  not  see  how  a ------:::_ 
- -~  _9,  ·~-
~~lectron:tc  .indust1~y  could 
-- -- - --~ _- - -__  '~--- :-:- '  :- :- -
developed  to its- preser1t.  s l:aqo. 
-
fact:or in  favour  of tho  nmlt:Lnationals  .is  their 
--
f1rEtt  'co -respond  to  industrial polit.ics,  for  it1stnr\ce, 
in  t.he  field of  regional development. 
Talking  about politics,  I  here  vletnt.  to  stress  t.ha t  the 
development of multinationals  is  largely  linked  to  and 
due  to  a  number...-'bf  international developments  v1hich  no 
-one  \'/ants  to destroy; ·a  gro-wing  intE:-!rnational  cooperation 
in  the  economic  and  monetary  field,  the  liberalisation 
o.~  trade,  the circulation of capital  and  people,  the 
vast growth  in the means  of  communication  and  in  the 
capacity of directing big  units  in  a  coordinated  way. 
---0  0-·-.. 
We  must  not hide  the  fact,  hO\·lever,. that the multi-
nationals at present also  rcpres~nt a  number  of  negative 
fea  tun~s,  some  of which  are  the  consecn.JPnce  of  thelr 
dJt·ect  advn.ntages.  'l'h:ts  Js  the-~  head  cH1d  taLl.  of  the  same 
cotn. 
The  effective decisionmaking  process  is often taking 
I - '  - -
'  -..  ' 
place abroad.  d.r(~af:es  l:h&  impresB:l()n.·· of  co:)..ontzat:iop 
.  -- .  - .  - -
in  t:he  receivfng' co\Jnf:::ty  ahd  has  a  bad  psychological 
eff:€!ct:  O"n  it::~;  populat:lort.  As  an  exmnple,  a  Belgian  snb-
-
§id:La:.r.y  of  an A:metiean  company  was  forbidden  to  export: 
agt·icultunil-mabh:i,n~~ry to  Cub~l  by  i.ts  parent company, 
·--_.- bE:~cause of  the  U.s.  embargo  of  Cuba. 
At  the  same  time  labour unions  find  their ac U.ons 
threatened,  since  the  effective decision  power  in cases 
of conflict will often be  outside  their  reacl1.  There  is 
even  the  fear  that  a  tough  conflict might  result in  the  . 
removal  of  the  industry  to  another  country.  Multinationals 
h.:we  u.sed  such  black-mai  1  a  number  of  times. 
Along  the  same  lines it can  be  mentioned  that multi-
nationals  through  their  investment  and  rationali7,ation 
progr~ts can  have  penetrating effects  on  individual 
countries or  regions. 
Another  disadvantage  resulting  from  potential mobility 
i~;  that  a  multinat.ional  has  great.· bargaining  powP-:r  vi s-a-vis 
national  authorities  for  obtain1ng maximum  benefi  t:s. 
It is,  of  course,  equally true  that differe11t  forms  of 
tax  evasion  can  be  orqan.izecl  by  multinat~iona.ls utilizing 
different  tax  systems  etc.  etc.  Furthermore,  from  time I 
' 
the  polll::ics  of· the  btqget mul t1nat:.icnJ<-lls,.Jlb.!! .·. 
in dtr'eCU contradJ.Ct:lon  \'lith  thf~  political,  econom.i(!{l). 
and  financial policies of  thc:~ir host countrles.  'I'he 
multi~ationals are  abl~ to develop  global  strategies, 
~hi~e ori  thedther  hand  neiEhef  rinions  nbr  governments 
have  the  sufficient 
11 count~;rvailing 11  pov1er  R.  clue  to 
national  frontiers. 
To  further  proposals  for  deal~ng with  the  negative 
effects of multinationals,  the  Commission  of  the  European 
.CoMnunities  has  made  a  study  issued  last November. 
'l,he  Commission  study deals with  seven· areas: 
a)  protection of  the  general interests,  i.e.  the 
interest of the general  public; 
b)  protection of  the  workers'  interest; 
c)  main t.enance  of  compe ti. tion;  ,, 
d)  takeover policy; 
e)  inducements offered ntultinationals  under  regional 
policy,  <::tc. ; 
f)  protection of  LDCs; 
and 
q)  an  i.rnprovE~d  Cowmission  :l.nfonnot.ton  apparntus  con-
ce:rntng  multinationals. 
Under  the  label of  prot.ecUon  of  the  general  intE!rest 
we  ftrsL  anc1  foremost  have  fisca.l  problems. l\s -you  v,':U.l  be  aware,  each  courlt:.t'y  ltJi l:h Jn  L:he  CommunitY 
has  dtfferent fiscal  systems  which  Inake  j  t  dlfficult 
for  th~  Community  to  propose  a  specific  ruling  for 
mul t.inn tionals and  which  c.n:la te  complEDd ties for  the 
operotion of  the multinationals also, 
'l'he  solution to  this problem  is  therefore for  the 
Community  as  such  to  try  to  harmonize·· its fiscal  system. 
Under  the  label of  the protection of  the general  interest 
there  is of  course  the  p1~oblem of  tax  evasion.  Due  to 
differences  in taxation  among  member  states,  the multi-
national  company will  - of course  - try to  take  ad-
vantaqe  of  such differences.  By  f·.ax  evasion  vle  mean 
any  device  which  can  be  used  in  order  to  take  advantage 
of  the differences  in contradiction  to  the  general 
scope  of  the  fiscal  systems  involved.  In  this  fiel.d, 
the  Comm.tss:i.on  proposes  a  further  st.ndy  of  the  pr.oblems 
of  tax  behavior  and  of  the  holdinq  company  sysh~m so  as 
to  qet  a  bE~ tter picture of  wha. t  p::.oposal s  i'lre  needed. 
Another  problem  under  Ud[;  headinq  Js  transfer pricing. 
'The  Comrnisslon  here  proposes  to  try  to  qet  some  kind  of 
a  common  concept of  hov;  to  deal  l.'.':i.t:h  transf<:~r  pricing. 
l\  further  problem  ar  Jses  from  the  rnovemE,nt  of  capJ tal, 
of  license  fees,  management  fees,  and  royaltles,  and 
the  interesting possibilities for  monetary  and  financial 
operations  which  can  be  concejved  through manipulations 
I 
; '13 ... 
d  .  .n  t:h.i.s  area.  Under  l::he  same  hemUng comes 
side of  tho  picture  which is the  quaran~1:E!e 
of  supply:  v1here,  we  notably  think of  energy  supply, 
especi.ally otl. 
This  is a  critical area  in  which  the  Co~nission unfortunate-
ly has  not  so  far  been  able  to  advance  any  proposals  which 
could  obtain  a  consensus  among  the  mernbe1:  states.  Further, 
ther£~ is public  interest;:  in  the question of  the  monetary 
policies of  the multinationals  and  their dealings  on  the 
short-term capital market.  No  J.nstrument  has  so  far  been 
devised  or  proposed.  W~at the  Conunission  has  asked  in its 
paper  is that the  Council  of  Ministers  should  approve  the 
creation of  instruments  to  deal  with  the  problem of  the 
multinationals  in  the  measure  that this  problem  relates 
to  short-term capital movements  within  the  economic  and 
monetary  union. 
In  the  fiel.d  of  state aid,  member  states  have  so  far 
had  what  I  VJould  tenn  an  auctiont~er  ing  a t:ti  tuch~,  t:o 
induce multinationals  to  set up  Jn  their  own  territory. 
Here  the  Commission  proposes  to deal  with  the  problem 
t~hrougll  th0  r.·ules  for  t:hn  regional  fund. 
As  far  as  the  prot.ec t.ion  of  sharc~holclers and  other 
interE)S t.:ed  parties  - for  instance,  creditors  - in  the 
operation of multinationals is concerned,  the  Commission ·is ;:nmxe  that.uniform rules  shou.Id  bf~­
pro teet:  sha:r.-eholders  and  cted itors in  takeover  hi  dB. 
This  was  just the first of  the  soven  areas. 
In  the  field  of  protection  of  worke~s, it is felt 
necessary  to  provide  workers  with  the  rights  they  have 
already obtained  in· cases  v1here  dec is  ions  a:re  taken  by 
a  multinational entailing collective dismissals or in 
cases  of mergers  that  migl1t  jeopardize the  security of 
the  indi.vidual  worker. 
Some  machinery vlill  be  'insU_ tuted  for  the  protection of 
wo:rkm:-s.  The  Commission  ts  trying  t:o  push  the  existing 
proposal  for  a  European  cooperative  status,  a  so-called 
Eurocompany  as  the  best  rernedy. 
The  question af maintaining  competition  should  be  seen 
together  with  the  question of  takeover  policies.  You 
will  all kno\v  how  arnb.ivc-1lent:  the  problem  of  anl:itrust 
and  competition policies are  in Western  Europe.  The 
Comwun:Lty  bound  by  the  Rome  T:r:eaty  to  mainta.in  com-
pet.it.ion.  The  Commission  has  proposed  requlations  whereby 
a  merger  proposal  has  to  be  examined  by  it,  to  see 
t~hat: it does  not frustrate  prospect::Lve  competition. 
P..s  far  as  takeover  policy  is concerned,  one  of  trw 
rna Jn  aJms  is to  try  to  pro teet  i:he  v1orker s'  rights.  'fhe ....  15  -
1-
Comm\.H1ity _hers  become  alaJ~tnEW  by  th·~~  :rate  of:  t.he  lncr(Hlses 
of  takeovers  ai1d  ht1s  felt  i.l:  nE.~C(~ss;:u~y  to  harmonize  the 
policy  tn  the  field of  company  tai~eOVf:'rl'l  vis-a-vis  the 
individual  member  stat~s. 
The  proposals  seek  to provide  t:he  Commun:l t.y  with  a  sort of 
embryonic  equivalent of  the  U.S.  Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission. 
In  pas sin9  r  I  \vou.ld  also mention  t:ha  t  in  the  fields  of 
stock  exchange  operations,  publicity  for  the  balance 
sheets of  the  companies,  of  course,  would  demand  that 
membe:r:  states get  tosrether  and  secure  coordination  by 
the different  stock  exchange  authorities  to  deal  with 
the  problem.  What  we  are trying  to  produce  is  a  unilateral 
jurisdi~tion for  these  problems.  This  is in itself  a 
neutral  t.hin~~,  which  only means  th< ;_  for  instance  U.s. 
multinationals  - instead  of  having  to  deal  with  many 
authorities  - would  be  able  to  deal  with  only one, 
covering  the  whole  Crnnmunity  area. 
In  the  field  of public  information,  there  is a  need 
to  compile  more  statisUcs,  not<tbly  t.~bout  tlw  financ:i.al 
flows  relating  to  mult:inat:iS:mals, so  as  l~o  be  able  to 
suqgest  some  sort of  financial  requlatlon  -.how  t.o  deal 
w.i.th  multinationals  and  how  to  cope  with  the  age  old 
problem  of  hot money. ~  Hi  -
As  Hu:  M{  !:he  devE..~1opinr:J  count.r:te~::  are  concerned,  \·Jhat·. 
we  really w.;ntt  to  tr:y  to  elabora  tr:~  is some  so:r t  of  code 
of  behavJor  for  European  based multinationals  to  deal 
with developing  countries  in  ways  that.  are fair  to  them. 
At  present 1  the most  cogent  propo~al that will'even-
tually  cornt~  throuqh  seems  to  be  a  body  of  requlati.ons 
relating  to  the  security of  workers  in cases  of mergers, 
regulations  concerning  tax evasion  and  regulations 
deal  i.ng  with dist-:.lrbance.s  on  the  short-·term capital 
market.  What  is  however  important  for  you  to  remember 
iB  that  th(::>  European  Commission  is \•lilli.ng  to  negotia.te 
these various problems.in all areas,  and  is negotiating 
them  in the  OECD.  They  are  also going  to  be  negotiated 
in Geneva  and  in the  U.N.  They  are  dealt with  jr1  the 
twice-yearly meetings  which  are  held  between  the  U.S. 
and  the  I·;.E.C.  and  which  are  beinq  inst:i.l:uted  C1lso  with 
Canada.  'Ihe  basic principles  :.:.o~:  the  Community  will  be 
non-discr  ind.nation  bet\-veen  foreign  based  i nves  tnH:: n t:s 
and  European  inves  l:rnents  and  reciprocity. 
1'lwnk  you. 